This Commentary presents two related theses: First, although consensus development conferences may be dismissed as art, there can be a science to them. Second, content experts and science bureaucrats should be the servants of such enterprises, not their masters. These theses were reinforced as I read the National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Conference Statement on breast cancer screening for women ages 40-49 (1) , and the subsequent reactions to it. 1 The two theses can be expressed in six propositions. For those with little time or short attention spans, these propositions are summarized in Table 1 , and the ''levels of evidence'' that can provide science to the enterprise appear in Table 2 .
The first three propositions have to do with screening in order to achieve early diagnosis, particularly of a potentially fatal or debilitating disease, and are included here because I haven't often found them acknowledged by screeners and screenees alike:
Early diagnosis improves survival when treatment is worthless.
This is so for three reasons: First, like other individuals who accept and follow health advice and take their medicine [e.g., coronary patients who faithfully take their placebos are much less likely to die than those who don't (2)], those who respond to invitations for screening often are destined for lower mortality at the outset. In a landmark trial of mammography and clinical examination of the breast, the two thirds of experimental women who accepted the invitation for screening had half the cardiovascular mortality of the one third who stayed away (3). Second, when the ''lead time'' of the earlier diagnosis achieved through screening is not corrected in short-term survival analyses, the spurious ''leftward'' shift in survival curves for screened patients guarantees an improvement in their short-term survival, even when treatment is ineffective (and individuals detected in this way are not given extra years forward, of life, but only extra years backward, of disease). Finally, slow-growing (better prognosis) cancers are ''at risk'' of detection for a longer time than fast-growing (poor prognosis) ones, and their overrepresentation in cohorts of patients whose cancers were detected through screening will, once again, suggest longer survival when therapy is worthless (4).
Even early diagnostic maneuvers that save lives will reduce health.
The screening maneuver that saves the life of one of three individuals diagnosed by the test can only shorten the healthy lives of the other two. The saved person is rewarded with an increased total life span; the other two are only harmed by premature knowledge of a ''silent'' morbidity. Thus, the introduction of even effective screening maneuvers lowers the average health of a town, and it is only when an abundance of saved lives accumulates that the net loss in the town's health recovers even to zero.
Soliciting the symptomless must promise them better health.
life. When deciding which treatments to offer them, I seek guidance from systematic reviews and randomized trials, but when this ''Level 1'' evidence is lacking I resort to nonexperimental evidence gleaned with study architectures at higher risk of error; my sick patient cannot wait for better evidence. However, when I invite the symptomless to volunteer for tests that achieve early diagnosis, surely my justification must be that, on average, they will benefit. This being so, and given the misinformation that flows from nonexperiments, I find Level 1 evidence of individual health benefit an absolute prerequisite for soliciting the symptomless for screening.
The acceptance of these propositions represents the conviction that some sorts of research architectures are more likely than others to reveal the truth and to limit error. Adoption of this conviction leads to the hierarchy depicted in Table 2 and culminates in the randomized trial and its systematic review (5).
The following three propositions apply to consensus conferences that do and do not employ such a hierarchy.
Conflicting conclusions might both be rational.
Politicians attempting to solve problems in the health system typically call for administrative reorganizations and other shortterm solutions; health professional organizations usually counter with demands for long-term investments in people and facilities. Each views the conclusions of the other as not simply wrong, but irrational. In fact, both might be rational (even when wrong) and simply result from pursuing different, sometimes incompatible, goals. So, too, when disparate groups come together in efforts to achieve consensus about whether and how to intervene in the health of the public. Members who ''must know'' will clash with members who ''must recommend.'' The former, who regard achieving certainty about the health effects of the proposed maneuver as the highest objective, will insist on evidence from the top of the hierarchy and, in its absence, will advocate silence. They are certain to clash, in the absence of this certainty, with other members who, because they ''must recommend,'' will descend down the hierarchy until they can generate the clear-cut recommendation that constitutes their goal.
Experts aren't.
By definition, experts seldom hesitate to tell us how to evaluate and manage our patients, and their opinion is sometimes placed on a par with Level 1 evidence by consensus committees. Thus, recent recommendations from the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association defined Class 1 evidence as ''conditions for which there is evidence [sic] and/or general agreement that a given procedure or treatment is beneficial, useful, and effective'' (6). But surely the experts of former eras, whose absurd therapeutic recommendations we deride, were at least as smart as the contemporary experts whose therapeutic recommendations we implement with uncritical reverence. And a growing body of evidence shows that when experts put their advice on paper they practice second-rate science. Thus, Cynthia Mulrow showed (7) that expert review articles routinely failed to use scientific methods to identify, assess, and synthesize information, and Andrew Oxman and Gordon Guyatt documented (8) an inverse relationship between adherence to these methods and the experts' self-professed expertise. (I have elsewhere described (9) the damage experts do to their areas of expertise and hope that readers of this note are indifferent to the news that I screen for some disorders but not for others.)
Truth is not often best determined by scheduling a press conference.
Three days is about enough time to carry out a clinical decision analysis for just one patient on my clinical service but too short a time for most of us to decide which automobile to buy, what color to paint the kitchen, or where to take our next holiday (despite prior experiences with all three). I was given five times as long simply to prepare this commentary, and the deliberation time of the gold standard assembly for systematically reviewing the effects of health care, a Review Group of the Cochrane Collaboration, is measured in years, not days. The imperatives imposed by scheduling a press release before a consensus conference begins brings us back to the fourth proposition: the goal is rational, but its relentless pursuit may do more harm than good to our patients.
How might these propositions be incorporated into a consensus conference? Such a deliberation could have five elements. First, it might begin by agreeing on a hierarchy of evidence, such as that described in Table 2 (or any other system judged suitable to its task). Second, it could use such a hierarchy to classify the evidence submitted by the experts who appear before it. Third, as shown in Table 2 , it could append to each recommendation a notation indicating the level of evidence on which it was based (thereby labeling imperative recommendations based on shaky evidence with cautions about their validity). Fourth, the timing Nonrandomized historic cohort studies C 5
Case-series C of its report could be dictated only by the completion of its deliberations. Fifth, it could reconvene to update its recommendations when better evidence became available. Impossible? Such an assembly has been held triennially since 1985 by the American College of Chest Physicians (10)-who commissioned the contents of Table 2 . And to the five elements described above, it added a sixth. When participants at its first meeting recognized that their ''strong'' recommendation that patients with non-valvular atrial fibrillation receive anticoagulants was based on low-level evidence, they proceeded to design and carry out some of the randomized trials which, when powerfully positive, raised that recommendation to Grade A at a subsequent conference.
